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WHICH WASHINGTON: CONSTITUTIONS IN
CONFLICT?
AN ANALYSIS OF YORK V. WAHKIAKUM
SCHOOL DISTRICT AND ITS POTENTIAL
EFFECT ON SCHOOL DRUG TESTING





Drug testing in interscholastic athletics presents a familiar tension. On
one hand, the dangers and downsides of doping by high school student-
athletes is, by most accounts, beyond debate. Accordingly, secondary schools
obviously have an interest in minimizing the use and abuse of performance-
enhancing substances by students. On the other hand, a student who also
chooses to be an athlete does not thereby sacrifice his or her basic privacy
interest. Complicating this familiar tension is a legal system that provides
varying degrees of protection against government intrusion, depending on
where a student-athlete lives and competes.
From our nation's capital, the U.S. Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable searches, including drug tests, and seizures.' A large body and
long history of jurisprudence sheds light on the intricacies of the Fourth
Amendment. Outside of Washington, D.C., however, state constitutions
throughout the union also protect citizens from unwarranted government
intrusion. At least some state constitutions, like the one in the State of
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Washington, provide different and greater protections than those found in the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 2 One recent case highlights how
differences between and among constitutions can yield different results for
challenged drug testing programs in secondary schools. 3
In this article, we analyze federal jurisprudence interpreting the Fourth
Amendment in the context of drug testing student-athletes in public secondary
schools. In the last thirteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has twice upheld
drug testing of secondary students. 4 We will then analyze a recent and
splintered decision in which the Supreme Court of Washington distinguished
federal authority and struck down a school district's testing policy for student-
athletes. 5 We conclude by exploring the impact of conflicting constitutions on
efforts to curb use of performance-enhancing drugs in athletics.
II. DRUG TESTING IN THE LAW - STUDENTS AND STUDENT-ATHLETES
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.6
This provision, of course, has been the subject of much litigation and
writing. With regard to drug testing in secondary schools, some of the
litigation and writing surround efforts to test a school's general student
population. Those instances are not part of this discussion. Other cases, more
pertinent here, focus on drug testing high school students who choose to
participate in extracurricular activities, such as interscholastic sports. 7
Undoubtedly, drug testing by a public school district constitutes a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 8 Indeed, it seems unlikely that
a drug test that, by its very nature, requires a student-athlete to submit a bodily
fluid to someone acting at the behest of a government agency to examine what
2. Compare WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008).
4. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995).
5. See York, 178 P.3d 995.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822;Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
8. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652; see generally Earls, 532 U.S. 822.
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substances the student consumed, can be considered anything but a search.
Because the tests are administered without a warrant, challenges to drug
testing policies have historically turned on whether policies constitute an
"unreasonable search." 9 As a result, to pass muster under federal law, any
warrantless search must be conducted in a way that is not unreasonable.
As mentioned in the preceding section, in the last thirteen years, the U.S.
Supreme Court examined two drug testing policies implemented by public
school districts and upheld the constitutionality of both policies, finding them
to be reasonable searches and, therefore, permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. 10 In examining student drug testing policies for reasonableness,
the U.S. Supreme Court pointed to various factors that supported a finding of
reasonableness. " I A brief description of the policies challenged in each case is
below, as well as a summary of the Court's rationale in upholding the policies.
A. Vernonia School District v. Acton 12
In the first case, Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Supreme Court, in
a six to three decision written by Justice Scalia, upheld the District's student
drug testing policy, finding it reasonable for several reasons. 13
Under the policy instituted by the Vernonia School District in Oregon, all
students who wished to play sports (and those students' parents) were required
to sign forms consenting to drug testing of the students. 14 Each of those
students was tested by urinalysis at the beginning of the season of any sport in
which he or she participated. 15 Additionally, student-athletes' names were
placed into a "pool" from which the names of ten percent of the athletes were
selected for random drug testing each week. 16  Whenever possible, the
student-athletes selected were notified and tested the same day their name was
drawn from the "pool.' 17 Under the policy, the District went to great lengths
to ensure the accuracy of the testing, protect the chain of custody of a student-
athlete's urine sample, and limit the number of people who knew the results of
the tests. 18
9. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 828; Acton, 515 U.S. at 652-53.
10. Earls, 536 U.S. at 825; Acton, 515 U.S. at 666.
11. Earls, 536 U.S. at 828-38; Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
12. Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
13. Id. at 664-65.




18. Id. at 650-51.
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In affirming the constitutionality of this policy, the Supreme Court
considered several factors. 19  First, it noted that student-athletes who
voluntarily choose to participate in interscholastic athletics have a lower
expectation of privacy than students in the general school population. 20
Second, it recognized that public school districts have a legitimate interest in
protecting the health and safety of their student-athletes and, therefore, have a
compelling interest in deterring drug use. 21 As a result of these findings, the
Court supported a contention that, as a threshold matter, a public school
district should be able to institute a drug testing policy for student-athletes, so
long as the actual policy is reasonable and not overly invasive. 22
The Court next examined the policy itself.23 In doing so, it found that, so
long as the urinalysis was taken under conditions similar to those typically
encountered in public restrooms, the urinalysis was only a negligible intrusion
upon student privacy. 24 Additionally, the drug test represented a minimal
intrusion on privacy because it was designed to detect only illegal drug use
(rather than including tests for alcohol consumption or prescription drug
use). 25  Further, the intrusion on student-athlete privacy was minimized
because the results were disclosed only to the limited school personnel who
needed to know in order to limit athletic participation. 26  Lastly, the
consequences of a positive test result were extremely limited because the
results were not included in the student's academic or school discipline files
and were not revealed to law enforcement officials; instead, student-athletes
who tested positive were referred to drug education classes, prohibited from
playing sports, or both. 27
All of these factors, taken together, supported the Court's 1995 decision to
find the Vernonia School District's student drug testing policy a reasonable
search that is permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 28
In a dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter, argued that suspicionless searches such as the random drug testing
19. Id. at 652-54.
20. Id. at 657.
21. Id. at661.
22. Id. at 664-65.
23. Id. at 654-55.




28. Id. at 664-65.
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policy at issue, are per se unreasonable unless the government can demonstrate
that a "suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual. ' 29 Indeed, the dissent
contended that random, suspicionless searches are exactly "what the Framers
of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed." 30  As a result, Justice
O'Connor argued that the suspicionless nature of the District's drug testing
policy made it unconstitutional unless the school district could demonstrate
that requiring reasonable suspicion would render the policy ineffectual. 31
Further, although Justice O'Connor clearly believed a suspicion-based testing
policy would be extremely effective for a school district, 32 the dissent rested
on what it considered the majority's fatal failure to account for the Court's
long-standing requirement that warrantless searches be based on reasonable
suspicion unless requiring such suspicion would result in an ineffective
search. 33
B. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls34
Three years later, citing similar concerns about the prevalence of student
drug use, the Tecumseh School District in Tecumseh, Oklahoma, instituted a
somewhat broader drug testing policy. 35 Under the Tecumseh policy, all
middle and high school students in the district who wished to participate in
any extracurricular activity were required to consent to urinalysis testing for
drugs. 36 Specifically, under one component of the policy, the students were
required to submit to drug testing before participating in an extracurricular
activity and random drug testing while participating. 37 Under a second
component of the policy, students were also subject to testing at any time upon
reasonable suspicion. 38
Believing that the broader nature of this policy made it less reasonable
than the Vernonia policy upheld by the Supreme Court, several high school
students and their parents challenged the constitutionality of the first
component of the Tecumseh policy, specifically alleging that the random
29. Id. at 667-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 669.
31. Id. at 678.
32. Seeid.
33. See id. at 684-86.
34. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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testing component violated the Fourth Amendment. 39 One of the arguments
put forth by the students was that, in order to be reasonable, drug testing
policies should require individualized suspicion before a student can be
required to submit to the test. 40 In response, a slight majority of the Supreme
Court 4' again upheld the policy, finding it reasonable and, therefore,
constitutionally permissible.
42
Engaging in a similar analysis as the one employed in deciding Acton, the
Supreme Court recognized that many of the factors considered in Acton with
regard to student-athletes should simply be extended and applied to all
students who wish to engage in any type of extracurricular activity. 43 As a
threshold matter, the Court found that, like the Vernonia School District, the
Tecumseh School District successfully demonstrated a legitimate need for its
policy because there was evidence of student drug use at district schools.
44
Further, the Court concluded that "the need to prevent and deter the substantial
harm of childhood drug use provid[ed] the necessary immediacy for [the]
school testing policy." 45
In examining the policy itself, the Court found that students who choose to
participate in extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many
of the same privacy intrusions that student-athletes do. 46 Further, because
extracurricular activities are often subject to stricter regulations than general
school activities, participants have a diminished expectation of privacy. 47 In
light of these factors and the custodial responsibilities of a public school
district, the Court upheld the District's policy and declared that individualized
suspicion was not required in school drug testing policies for students
engaging in extracurricular activities. 48
Justice O'Connor's dissent consists of only one paragraph, in which she
reiterated her belief that Acton was wrongly decided and, because the majority
39. Id. at 827 n.2 (stating that the plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of the
suspicion-based portion of the policy).
40. Id. at 829.
41. Id. at 825, 838, 842-55. Justice Thomas authored the five to four majority opinion, in which
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer joined. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter,
wrote one dissenting opinion and Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Souter,
wrote a second dissent.
42. Id. at 838.
43. See id. at 830.
44. Id. at 834.
45. Id. at 836.
46. Id. at 831.
47. Id. at 832.
48. Id. at 836-38.
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decision in Earls rested on Acton, Earls was therefore also wrongly decided. 49
Justice Ginsburg's dissent focused on differences between the drug testing
policies in the two cases and argued that the testing program at issue in Earls
was unreasonable, capricious, and even perverse. 50
Specifically, this dissent pointed out that, in reaching its decision in Acton,
the majority emphasized that drug use by student-athletes increased the risk of
injuries and that the Vernonia School District's student-athletes were the
leaders of an "epidemic" drug culture in the District. 51 The Pottawatomie
School District, on the other hand, had admitted that the drug problem in its
schools was "not... major" and that drug use by students involved in
extracurricular activities was not associated with any special dangers. 52
In drawing additional distinctions between the testing policies at issue in
Acton and Earls, the four-justice dissent explicitly stated that Acton "cannot be
read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all students upon
any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life and health
of those who use them." 53 According to this dissent, the Acton court applied a
fact-specific balancing test and concluded that, in the particular circumstances
at issue in that case, the balance weighed in favor of upholding the
constitutionality of the Vemonia School District drug testing policy. 54  In
contrast, the dissenters argued that the same balancing test should have yielded
a different result in Earls because the facts were entirely different, primarily
because students involved in extracurricular activities have a higher
expectation of privacy than do student-athletes. 55 Overall, a majority of the
Supreme Court has made clear that random, suspicionless drug testing of
student-athletes does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 56
III. So THE LAW IS SETTLED?
At first blush, another challenge to random drug testing would appear
futile in light of the Supreme Court's rulings in Acton 57 and Earls. 58 After all,
49. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 844.
54. Id. at 847.
55. Id. at 846-47.
56. See id. at 822; see generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
57. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
58. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822.
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the nation's highest court held not once, but twice, that school officials may
drug test students involved in interscholastic athletics or other extracurricular
activities. 59 Therefore, when two families challenged a rural Washington
school district's drug testing policy the case 60 should have been an easy one,
right? Wrong.
In 1994, the small Wahkiakum School District began exploring ideas to
curb drug and alcohol use by the student population. 61 The school district,
with three buildings and approximately 500 students, is located in Cathlamet,
Washington. 62 Cathlamet is situated along the banks of the Columbia River,
which separates the State of Washington from the State of Oregon.
The level of drug and alcohol use among students in the public school
district was not acceptable to the Wahkiakum Board of Directors and it looked
for a remedy. 63 School officials formed the Drug and Alcohol Advisory
Committee (Committee) (later renamed the Safe and Drug Free Schools
Advisory Committee) to consider prevention programs or strategies. 64 The
Committee recommended and the school adopted a number of programs.
65
According to surveys filed by the parties, however, drug and alcohol use in the
Wahkiakum School District was still a problem in 1998.66
During the summer of 1999, the Committee contemplated and
recommended a policy requiring random drug testing of students involved in
extracurricular activities. 67 On September 20, 1999, the Board of Directors
accepted the Committee's recommendation and voted to adopt Policy 3515.68
On October 18, 1999, the Board of Directors revised Policy 3515 to cover only
those students participating in interscholastic athletics. 69 In fact, Policy 3515
was modeled after the Vernonia School District's policy upheld by the
Supreme Court in Acton. 70
Pursuant to the policy, student-athletes agreed to be drug tested by
59. See id.; Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
60. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995, 997 (Wash. 2008).
61. Id. at 998.
62. Welcome to Wahkiakum, WELCOMETOWAHKIAKUM.COM,
http://www.welcometowahkiakum.com/mules.htmI (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).





68. Brief of Appellant at 7, York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008) (No.
78946-1).
69. Id.
70. York, 178 P.3d at 1000; see generally Vemonia Sch. Dist. V. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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urinalysis as a condition of participation in athletics. 71 On a weekly basis
during the academic year, school officials randomly drew names of one
middle school student-athlete and two high school student-athletes. 72 Those
selected were driven to the county health clinic and required to provide a urine
specimen to county health officials. 73 Although the health officials were near
the student-athletes during urination, they did not directly observe the
specimen collection. 74 Collected specimens were then sent to a toxicology
laboratory for testing. 75 If testing did not reveal the presence of prohibited
substances, the school took no further action.76 In the event of a positive test,
the student-athlete was suspended from athletic participation, but not from
school. 77 The exact nature or duration of the penalty depended on a variety of
factors, including the type of substance detected. 78 In the event of subsequent
positive tests, the penalties became more severe. 79
During the 1999-2000 school year, student-athletes Aaron and Abraham
York were tested pursuant to Policy 3515.80 Similarly, student-athlete Tristan
Schneider was tested during the 2000-2001 school year. 81 Represented by the
American Civil Liberties Union, the York and Schneider families brought suit
against the Wahkiakum School District on December 17, 1999.82
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Policy 3515 violated article I, section 7
of the Washington Constitution 83 and the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 84 When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Earls85 in 2002,
the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourth Amendment claim. 86 Retaining their
claim under the state constitution, the plaintiffs sought an order enjoining
71. Id. at 998.
72. See generally id.
73. Id. at 1021 (Johnson, J., concurring).








82. Brief of Appellant at 14, York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008) (No.
78946-1).
83. WASH. CONST. art I, § 7 (providing that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law").
84. York, 178 P.3d at 998-99, n.4.
85. See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
86. York, 178 P.3d at 999, n.4.
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enforcement of Policy 3515.87
The trial court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction
and ultimately ruled in favor of the School District on cross motions for
summary judgment. 88 The Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review
and heard the case en banc. 89 In light of the authorities discussed above, one
might think that the result would be plain and the arguments simple.
However, this was not the case.
IV. WARRANTLESS DRUG TESTING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON
Rather than an easy case following fresh Supreme Court precedent, the
drug test dispute yielded a splintered plurality opinion against the School
District.9" Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Acton and Earls, the
Washington Supreme Court struck down the drug testing policy. 91 Although
all justices agreed Policy 3515 was unconstitutional in Washington, there was
significant disagreement regarding the status of Washington law and the reach
of the state constitution. 92
A. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Sanders delivered the plurality opinion and began his analysis by
noting the "strong arguments, policies, and opinions marshaled on both sides"
of the drug testing debate. 93 Indeed, the Attorney General for the State of
Washington submitted an amicus brief in support of the School District, while
the Washington Education Association and the Drug Policy Alliance
submitted an amicus brief in support of the families challenging Policy
3515. 94 Rather than camping on policy matters, however, the Court quickly
narrowed the legal issue and acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court's activity
in school drug testing cases. 95  The plurality also repeated the material
difference in language between article I, section 7 of the Washington
87. Id. at 998-99.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 996, 999.
90. See id. at 996.
91. Id. at 997.
92. See id. at 1006-21.
93. Id. at 999.
94. Id. at 1012 (Madsen, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 999.
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Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 96
Specifically, the opinion noted that, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the relevant
provision of Washington's Constitution does not contain a reasonableness
standard. 97 Rather, article I, section 7 simply provides that "[n]o person shall
be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." 98  The Fourth Amendment, in contrast, provides "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 99
Given the difference in language, passing muster under the U.S.
Constitution does not guarantee a like result under the Washington
Constitution. '00 While the Fourth Amendment focuses on the reasonableness
of a search, article I, section 7 focuses only on whether a search is supported
by "authority of law."' 0 ' To determine whether the Washington Constitution
provides greater protections than the U.S. Constitution in a particular context,
the court must make a two-step analysis. 102 First, the court "must determine
whether the state action [at issue] constitutes a disturbance of one's private
affairs."' 1 3  Second, the court must determine "whether authority of law
justifies the intrusion."' 1 4  "Authority of law" is satisfied when there is a
warrant or a "jealously guarded" exception to the warrant requirement. 105
Following this framework, the plurality opinion first concluded that
requiring a student-athlete to provide a urine specimen intrudes into his or her
expectation of privacy. 10 6 The court acknowledged that, in some instances,
students have a lower expectation of privacy, but reaffirmed that providing
bodily fluids "is a significant intrusion on a student's fundamental right of
privacy."' 1 7 Having so concluded, the court turned to analyze whether the
school drug tests were conducted with authority of law. 108
Because the drug tests were not conducted pursuant to a warrant, the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. York, 178 P.3d at 1000.
101. Id. at 1000-01.





107. Id. at 1002.
108. Id. at 1003.
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specific question was whether an existing exception to the warrant
requirement applied, or, if not, whether Washington should adopt a "special
needs" exception. 109 Although the court identified the short list of exceptions
to the warrant requirement in Washington, none was relevant here."
l0
Therefore, the School District urged the court to borrow from federal law and
adopt an analog to the "special needs" exception. I' After discussing the
"special needs" exception under federal law and after reviewing relevant state
cases, the court found no common law support for expanding warrant
exceptions in Washington and declined to do so.12 Perhaps responding to
arguments in a concurring opinion, Justice Sanders closed the plurality opinion
by attempting to reconcile its conclusion with prior cases upholding
suspicionless searches under article I, section 7.113
The plurality opinion was a direct and straightforward analysis of a narrow
legal question in light of the limited record presented. Justice Sanders did not
wander far in one direction or another.
B. The Separate Concurrences
Three separate concurring opinions question Justice Sanders's
reasoning. 114  In the first, Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Johnson,
Fairhurst, and Bridge agreed that Policy 3515 was unconstitutional, but argued
that, in certain circumstances, Washington courts should recognize the
"special needs" exception to the warrant requirement."l 5 These concurring
justices argued that the exception is rooted in "well-established common law
principles," and that the exception was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. TL.O. 116 - a case citing favorably the view of the
Washington Supreme Court. 117 While these justices would keep open the
possibility of a "special needs" exception, they agreed that suspicionless tests
by the Wahkiakum School District would not fit within the exception for
several reasons. 118
First, the concurring justices argued that, to support a suspicionless testing
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1003-05.
112. Id. at 1005.
113. Id. at 1005-06.
114. Id. at 996.
115. Id. at 1006 (Madsen, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 1008; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
117. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 (1985).
118. York, 178 P.3d at 1012 (Madsen, J., concurring).
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program, the school must have shown that a program requiring individualized
suspicion was unworkable. 119 They did not believe the Wahkiakum School
District sustained its burden and noted that students are under almost constant
surveillance. 120 As such, teachers, coaches, peers, and others are in a position
to notice observable manifestations of drug or alcohol use. 121 Second, the
concurring justices argued that the record lacked "evidence that drug use
actually interfere[d] with the school's ability to maintain order, discipline
and... safety."' 122 Third, the concurring justices noted that there was no
evidence showing that student-athletes accounted for a disproportionately high
number of drug users. 123 Rather than their impact on the drug problem,
student-athletes were selected for drug testing based only on their lower
privacy expectation. 124 Finally, the concurring justices argued that balancing
the relevant "interests at stake weigh[ed] against allowing suspicionless drug
testing."'125 In weighing the respective interests, the concurring justices noted
the strong privacy interest in students' excretory functions, the low probability
that Policy 3515 would accomplish its goals and the low deterrence 'rate
associated with random tests. 126
Rejecting the School District's position regarding the dangers of student
drug use, the concurring justices wrote that "the harm threatened by the unfair
use of performance-enhancing drugs is simply not great enough to justify
nonconsensual suspicionless drug testing."' 127 Together with their question
about whether "drug use actually interferes with the school's ability to
maintain order, discipline, and student safety,"' 128 one wonders if these
concurring justices might have been moved to a different result with a more
complete factual record. The answer is likely in the negative, given Justice
Johnson's clear awareness (in the third concurring opinion) of the dangers
surrounding doping by student-athletes. 129 Still the questions, rather than the
result, leave observers wondering whether these concurring justices appreciate
the gravity of doping in interscholastic athletics.
119. Id. at 1007.
120. Id. at 1010.
121. Id. at 1010-11.




126. Id. at 1011-12.
127. Id. at 1011, n.1.
128. Id. at 1011.
129. See id. at 1015, 1019 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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The second concurrence consists only of a single paragraph by Justice
Chambers. 130 In the short concurring opinion, he questioned whether the
privacy interest in a student-athlete's urine, as recognized in this case, could
be reconciled with recent precedent finding lesser privacy interest in saliva and
DNA. 131 Other than finding the analysis "paradoxical" when compared with
the analysis of other bodily fluids, Justice Chambers fully concurred in the
result. 132
In the third separate concurrence, Justice Johnson agreed with the result in
the case at issue but opined that school drug testing programs could be upheld
in certain circumstances. 133 Specifically, Justice Johnson argued that school-
aged students generally, and student-athletes specifically, have privacy rights
that are different and lower than adults. 134 By way of example, he discussed
searches of student lockers and compulsory vaccinations. 135 Justice Johnson
noted, however, that even students' privacy interest in bodily functions is
significant. 136
Interestingly, and unlike the other concurring justices, Justice Johnson also
acknowledged the severe risks of drug or alcohol abuse by student-athletes. 137
In light of these dangers, he argued that schools have the authority and the
responsibility to protect students. 138
Justice Johnson then turned to an analysis of article I, section 7 and
Washington search and seizure law. 139 In contrast to the plurality opinion, he
found that Washington courts already recognize a "special needs" exception to
the warrant requirement in certain limited circumstances. 140 Although the
issue was not before the court, he opined that a drug test policy based on
individualized suspicion would provide greater protection of constitutional
rights and pass constitutional muster in Washington. 141 He also added that
random suspicionless testing could, in his opinion, be constitutional. 142
130. See id. at 1012-13 (Chambers, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 1013.
132. Id.
133. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1013-15.
135. Id. at 1016.
136. Id. at 1015.
137. Id. at 1014, 1019.
138. Id. at 1015
139. Id. at 1015-16.
140. Id. at 1016.
141. Id. at 1018.
142. Id. at 1019.
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"Under certain circumstances," he wrote, "the balance between the
government's interest in suspicionless drug testing and student-athletes'
privacy rights might weigh in favor of testing."' 143 Those circumstances
would require a drug testing program that is 1) designed to protect a
compelling interest, 2) narrowly tailored to address the problem, and 3)
minimally intrusive. 144 Because Justice Johnson did not believe Policy 3515
of the Wahkiakum School District satisfied those requirements, he joined the
decision to strike the policy. 145
V. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR OTHER STATES?
Although at first glance it might appear that the Washington Supreme
Court's decision in York rejected clear precedent established by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the York court's carefully reasoned decision reveals that this is
not the case. 146 Rather, the York decision rested solely on an interpretation of
the Constitution of Washington, which provides a significantly different level
of protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 147
Where the Fourth Amendment protects United States citizens against
"unreasonable searches and seizures"' 148 by government officials, article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution protects Washington residents
from such disturbances in their private affairs "without authority of law."' 149
The somewhat subtle distinction between the federal and state constitutional
provisions serves as the cornerstone for very different results to challenges
against student drug testing policies, even policies that are similar in all
aspects other than the location of the school district.
Although many believe the U.S. Supreme Court essentially granted
permission for all public school districts to implement policies of random,
suspicionless drug testing of students involved in interscholastic athletics or
extracurricular activities, York reveals that the matter is not so simple after
all. 150 Instead, York could provide support and authority for challenges to
high school drug testing policies in states with constitutional provisions that,
like article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, do not contain a
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1020-21.
146. Id. at 995.
147. See generally id.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
150. See generally York, 178 P.3d 995.
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reasonableness component to warrantless searches. '51
A survey of the fifty states reveals that the vast majority of state
constitutions include a reasonableness requirement for warrantless searches. 152
A handful of states, however, have constitutional provisions that could support
successful challenges to a high school drug testing policy, which is not
narrowly-tailored and carefully drafted. 153 Specifically, Arizona, Maryland,
North Carolina, and VermontI 54 completely omitted any reference to
reasonableness from their constitutional provisions regarding searches and
seizures.
Additionally, several other states that include a reasonableness component
in the relevant constitutional provision have common law doctrines that may
provide greater protection from warrantless searches than that provided by the
reasonableness standard built into the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 5 5  These states include, but are not necessarily limited to,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 156
The Massachusetts Constitution, part 1, article XIV provides (in relevant
part) that "[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures, of his person... ." 157 However, the remainder of the
article provides broader protections than the Fourth Amendment. 158
Additionally, Massachusetts defines "unreasonable" pursuant to its own
constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution. 159 Therefore, cases interpreting
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment may not apply in
Massachusetts. For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has twice
invalidated drug testing in highly regulated industries, relying on the state's
particular interpretation of reasonableness. 160
151. See generally id.
152. State Constitutions, USCONSTITUTION.NET, http://www.usconstitution.net/stateconst.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
153. Id.
154. See ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; MD. CONST. art. XXVI; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST.
ch. I, art. 11.
155. SeeN.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
156. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
157. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 532
N.E.2d 644, 652 (Mass. 1989) (applying state constitutional reasonableness standard to invalidate Act
permitting drug testing in "highly regulated industry" of racing); Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 582
N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1991) (applying state constitutional reasonableness standard to invalidate
urine drug testing for police officers because they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
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Similarly, although the New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Tennessee
state constitutions 161 protect their respective citizens against "unreasonable"
searches, each state uses its own definition of reasonableness. 162 Therefore,
high school drug testing policies in these states might also be more susceptible
to invalidation on state constitutional grounds than in other states across the
country.
VI. PROBLEMS PRESENTED WHEN CONSTITUTIONS CONFLICT
Although there is much to be said for a governmental system in which
individual states are free to adopt legislation that differs from either that
adopted by the federal government or that adopted by other states, the system
can also create practical problems. With regard to student-athlete drug testing
policies in public secondary schools, the system can undermine the desire of
individual states and school districts to promote academics over athletics,
protect student-athletes from exploitation, and maintain competitive equity.
Specifically, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Acton and Earls,
school districts have a "custodial and tutelary responsibility for children." 163
As part of this responsibility, school districts are permitted to implement
suspicionless drug testing policies to protect students from the dangers of
illegal drug use.164 According to the Supreme Court, these dangers include,
but are not limited to, increased risk of injury, disengagement from school and
social activities, and a decline in academic success. 165 However, as discussed
by the York court and in the section above, public secondary schools in
Washington (and possibly a handful of other states) are, absent protections not
yet tested, prohibited from attempting to fulfill their custodial responsibilities
by enacting policies that utilize random drug testing of student-athletes. 166
This can lead to vastly different treatment of student-athletes in one state as
compared to another.
contents of their urine).
161. See N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
162. See, e.g., State v. Leiper, 761 A.2d 458, 461 (N.H. 2000) (stating that the state constitution
provides "at least as much protection as the Federal Constitution" (emphasis added)); State v.
Forrester, 541 S.E.2d 837, 841 (S.C. 2001) (holding that the people of South Carolina intended for
their Constitution to provide "a higher level of' protection than that provided by the U.S.
Constitution); State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (recognizing that the state
constitution may provide Tennessee citizens with greater protection than the Federal Constitution).
163. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 830 (2002).
164. See id.
165. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661-62.
166. See generally York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008).
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It is well settled that subjecting the competition rules to multiple local
regulations may seriously compromise interstate competitions. Generally
speaking, drug testing policies at public secondary schools are created to deter
drug use among students, particularly student-athletes. Therefore, a practical
and intended effect of the policy is to prevent student-athletes from using
illegal or performance-enhancing drugs. If such a policy is adopted by several
districts within a state, or by all members of a high school athletic association,
a secondary practical effect is the promotion of competitive equity. On the
other hand, if districts and states apply different policies, competitive equity
may be undermined.
As determined by the York court, public secondary schools in the State of
Washington cannot institute a suspicionless drug testing policy without
running afoul of the state constitution. 167 On the other hand, the Acton court
has made clear that, just across the border in Oregon, public school districts
can institute suspicionless drug testing policies. 168 Assuming that a drug
testing policy has its intended effect of deterring drug use by student-athletes,
student-athletes in Oregon school districts with an anti-doping policy are less
likely to use drugs than those in Washington school districts that are precluded
from implementing a similar policy. As a result, and by way of a hypothetical
example, if a high school team from the Vernonia School District travels
across the border into Washington to play the Wahkiakum School District's
high school team, competitive equity between the teams is compromised
because the players are subjected to two entirely different sets of rules
regarding the use of illegal drugs.
Specifically, whether any Wahkiakum student-athletes used performance-
enhancing or otherwise illegal drugs would likely be unknown because they
cannot be randomly tested. 169 However, following the Supreme Court's
reasoning, the Wahkiakum student-athletes would be more likely to have used
drugs than the Vernonia student-athletes who are deterred from doing so based
on the threat of drug testing at virtually any moment. Carrying the argument
one step farther, drugs used by the Wahkiakum student-athletes may give them
a significant competitive advantage over their counterparts from the Vemonia
School District and may pose a greater risk of harm to the Vernonia student-
athletes who are not competing while under the effects of any drugs.
The potential problem is highlighted by these cases, but it is not limited to
two school districts near the Washington-Oregon boundary. The problem is
broader and, in fact, extends beyond the playing field, diamond, court, course,
167. See id. at 1001-03, 1006.
168. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
169. See generally York, 178 P.3d 995.
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track, pitch, or pool. For example, a secondary school student-athlete doping
in the State of Washington will likely compete in athletics throughout high
school unless he or she otherwise violates applicable eligibility rules. A
similarly-situated student-athlete in Oregon, however, may be declared at least
temporarily ineligible as a result of the same decision to abuse performance-
enhancing drugs. To the extent athletics are important in secondary education
(although obviously not a property right), a student-athlete in one state
participates undetected, while another in a neighboring state sits in street
clothes on the bleachers. And to the extent high school student-athletes are
competing for attention and scholarships from colleges or universities, the
playing field is not level when some are subject to random testing and others
are not.
Disuniformity is an unintended but very real side effect of having different
constitutional protections between and among the various states. It hardly
seems, however, that the entire structure of the American government should
be rewritten to eliminate this type of disparity. Indeed, is the freedom of states
to legislate not part of what makes America great?
VII. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
Parts of secondary education nationwide are governed by uniform federal
authorities. For example, as recipients of federal funds and as political
subdivisions of the state, public schools are subject to U.S. Department of
Education regulations, 170  federal discrimination laws, 171 federal
confidentiality laws, 172 federal performance standards, 173 and, of course,
requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In addition, access to certain funding
dollars for special education is conditioned on providing services and
procedural safeguards to students with disabilities.174 This extensive federal
regulation notwithstanding, much of everyday life in secondary schools is
governed by state, local, and district authority. Therefore, schools and
students are accustomed to different policies, curricula, and mandates between
and among the states. In other words, in the educational context, secondary
schools in neighboring states do not enjoy or expect consistency in many
areas. Even school districts within a single state operate under materially
170. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 74-86, 97-99 (2007).
171. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-e et seq. (2006); Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 104 (2007).
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
173. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2006).
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006).
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different policies and procedures.
While lack of uniformity is the norm in the educational context, it is not so
in the athletic context. Rules of competition are largely consistent nationally.
Rules governing eligibility, transfers, and recruiting of high school student-
athletes are generally governed by state-wide athletic associations, each
bearing a striking resemblance to the other. Even the state-wide associations
have a degree of centralization through the National Federation of State High
School Associations.
Consistency in athletic rules and inconsistency in education may not make
good public policy, but it is a general reality. Assuming that general
consistency in athletics, or at least rules governing secondary athletics, is
beneficial to student-athletes and society, can and should the United States
move toward uniformity and consistency with regard to anti-doping efforts in
secondary schools? These are obviously separate questions, and only the first
will be addressed here.
One means to uniformity ?s legislative intervention by Congress; however,
several fatal problems with this remedy are apparent. First, as highlighted by
York and the discussion above, some states have, in essence, "occupied the
field" with constitutional protections which reach further than the Fourth
Amendment, making viable legislation nearly impossible to draft. 175 Second,
federal anti-doping legislation governing secondary schools is probably not
politically feasible. Indeed, past efforts to federalize the issue have failed. 176
Not only are constitutions arguably in conflict, so are representatives from
individual states. Third, unless Congress also earmarks many millions of
dollars to support drug tests and enforcement requirements, federal legislation
would likely run afoul of the Constitution as an unfunded mandate. 177 In any
event, congressional attention to doping is normally targeted toward
professional sports.
Rather than creating a controversial unfunded mandate, another option
would be for Congress to make federal money available to states that satisfy
certain uniform drug testing standards. Like legislative requirements, this
incentive option has significant flaws, and until doping in secondary schools
reaches a fever pitch, Congress is unlikely to direct substantial money to
secondary schools for purely athletic, rather than educational, purposes.
Instead, as the Office of National Drug Control Policy has already
demonstrated, the government is willing to make grant money available to
175. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008).
176. See, e.g., Empowering Parents to Fight Drugs Act of 1999, H.R. 1735, 106th Cong. (1999);
Parental Consent Drug Testing and Counseling Act, H.R. 1642, 106th Cong. (1999).
177. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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those schools that elect to drug test student-athletes engaged in extracurricular
activities. 178  Nevertheless, while grant money may encourage drug
prevention and drug testing programs, it is not designed to legislate
consistency.
There are obviously countless and firmly-held opinions regarding the best
strategy for addressing doping in secondary schools. Political leaders,
individual states, discrete boards of education, and even co-authors of an
academic article cannot agree about appropriate doping solutions.
Accordingly, for these and many other reasons, regulation of doping in
secondary schools is and must be either a state or local matter. In fact, the
state and local level is exactly where current anti-doping efforts are occurring.
To date, we have seen state legislatures, state activity associations, and local
school boards wrestle with strategies for ridding secondary sports of
performance-enhancing substances. In addition to the drug testing policies
challenged in Acton, Earls, and York, hundreds of public school districts have
opted to begin drug testing student-athletes. 179 Furthermore, New Jersey, 180
Florida, 181 Texas, 182 and Illinois1 83 have explored and adopted state-wide
standards prohibiting the use of performance enhancing substances by
secondary student-athletes. Although similar efforts have failed in other
states, such as Missouri, the trend toward state-wide standards is expected to
continue. Other states are expected to take a "wait and see" approach as these
pilot programs evolve.
State and local authorities are in the best position to understand regional
circumstances, craft effective testing procedures, and, perhaps most
importantly, assure compliance with the various state constitutional
provisions. Obviously, not all states and not all school districts will move in
178. NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, THE WHITE HOUSE 13 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehousedrug policy.gov/publications/pdf/strategy2003.pdf.
179. See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995); York, 178 P.3d 995.
180. N.J. STATE INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS'N, STEROID TESTING POLICY (2006),
available at http://www .njsiaa.org/NJSIAA/06steroidmemo.pdf (developed in accordance with
Executive Order 72 issued by the Governor of New Jersey on December 20, 2005).
181. FLA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS'N, Policy 33, Policy on the Use of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Other Substances, 2008-09 FHSAA HANDBOOK 161, available at http://www.fhsaa.org/rules/
handbook/0809_handbook3.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2008).
182. UNIV. INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, ANABOLIC STEROID TESTING PROGRAM (2007),
available at http://www.uil.utexas.edu/athletics/health/steroid-information.html (mandated by Senate
Bill 8, passed by the 80th Texas Legislature, signed by the governor and effective June 15, 2007).
183. ILL. HIGH SCH. ASS'N, Policy 24, Performance-Enhancing Drug Testing Policy, 2008-09
IHSA HANDBOOK 100 available at http://www.ihsa.org/org/policy/2008-09/policies.pdf (last visited
Aug. 12, 2008).
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the direction of testing student-athletes, and those that do so will no doubt
choose very different paths. Some state officials and school board members
who elect to march in that direction will, like the Wahkiakum School District,
find their efforts challenged in court. Those officials and elected leaders,
however, are not without judicial guidance. While complete uniformity
cannot be possible and is probably unnecessary, York and each new court
decision provides policy drafters across the country with guidance helpful in
crafting a constitutional policy for detecting and punishing users of
performance enhancing drugs. 184
VIII. CONCLUSION
The York decision directly impacts the ability of public school districts in
the State of Washington to develop and implement random, suspicionless
student-athlete drug testing policies. In light of the precise and unique
language of the Washington Constitution, the technical legal impact of the
York decision will likely be limited to a relatively small number of states. The
decision, however, highlights the problems encountered by states or public
secondary schools attempting to curb use or abuse of performance-enhancing
substances. It also highlights the difficulty in finding a consistent strategy
between and among the states for tackling the doping problem in secondary
athletics. Finally, it illustrates the limited application the Fourth Amendment
may have in determining these difficult issues.
184. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008).
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